




























































  The Means to Live discussion paper series 
 
This paper is one of a series that examine the targeting mechanisms of poverty 
alleviation programmes across different sectors. The papers form part of the Means to 
Live Project, based at the Children’s Institute (CI), University of Cape Town (UCT). 
This project aims to evaluate the State’s targeting mechanisms used to realise the socio-
economic rights of poor children and their families. 
  
The project is a collaborative project of the Child Rights and Child Poverty Programmes 
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This discussion paper on children’s right to free primary health care in South African is one 
of a series written for the Children’s Institute’s Means to Live Project. The project’s aim is 
to evaluate the government’s targeting mechanisms used to ensure the realisation of the 
socio-economic rights of poor children and their families. Put more simply, it seeks to 
establish whether current poverty alleviation initiatives are adequately designed and 
implemented to reach the poor, including children. By focusing on a number of elements of 
poverty alleviation with significant consequences for children, it will provide answers to the 
question of whether the poor are able to realise their socio-economic rights through access 
to these programmes. The research will be used to advocate for the necessary development 
or changes to government policies and programmes to ensure the realisation of these socio-
economic rights.  
 
Other poverty alleviation policies covered in this series include the: 
• School Fee Exemption policy (the right to education) 
• National School Nutrition Programme (the right to basic nutrition) 
• Free Basic Water policy (the right to water) 
• Housing Subsidy Scheme (the right to basic shelter and housing) 
• Child Support Grant (the right to social security) 
 
The Means to Live is a multi-stage, two-year project. The first phase comprised this series 
of policy reviews on selected poverty alleviation programmes and their targeting. The 
second phase will be primary research conducted during the second half of 2005. The final 
research report will be released in 2006.  
 
This paper focuses on free health care provision to children as an example of a targeted, 
indirect poverty alleviation mechanism. The paper outlines the history of free health care 
policy as a component of the transformed post-apartheid health system. The implementation 
of this policy in South Africa is reviewed, and comparison is drawn with experiences with 
user fees and the introduction of free health care in a number of African countries. Finally, 
it comments on free health care as an appropriate health sector targeting mechanism in the 
context of widespread poverty. 
 
Children’s right to health 
South Africa has one of the most progressive constitutions in the world. In particular, the 
inclusion of a special section on children in the Bill of Rights not only highlights the 
country’s special consideration for children, but also extends and complements children’s 
entitlements to the range of social, economic, political and cultural rights contained in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 1989). This international human rights treaty was ratified by South Africa in 1995, 
and together with the Constitution, provides a foundation for ensuring the realisation of 
children’s health rights.  
 




Child health rights 
 
CRC Article 24:  States should accord children, “The right to the highest level of health 
possible through the duty to ensure the right to access to health services”.  
 
South African Constitution, Section 27: “The right to have access to health care services 
for all South Africans.”  
 
South African Constitution, Section 28 (1) (c): Children’s “right to basic health care 
services”. 
 
To comply with both the CRC and the South African Constitution, the State is thus obliged 
to accord children the right to basic health care services and to put in place mechanisms 
towards such realisation.    
 
Despite several commitments made to children since attaining political democracy in 1994, 
the country is still some way from realising children’s right to health. The current health 
status of South African children is not optimal, as reflected by poor overall health indices 
and wide health disparities between groups.  
 
Child mortality indicators have worsened over the past decade, with the infant mortality rate 
(IMR) rising from 45 in 1998 to an estimated 59 in 2000, and the under-five mortality rate 
increasing from 59 in 1998 to an estimated 95 in 2000. This is mainly ascribed to the HIV 
pandemic, as HIV contributes to almost 40% of child deaths in the under-five age group 
(Bradshaw, Groenewald, Laubscher, Nannan, Nolijana, Norman, Pieterse & Schneider 
2003).  
 
Inequities in health status have been persistent over many decades across different groups 
within the child population of South Africa. Rich children versus poor, urban dwellers 
versus rural, and young children versus older children have very different prospects for 
health and survival. This pattern goes back in time to as early as 1944, when the IMR for 
White children was recorded at 50, but for African children the IMR was estimated at 
between 150 and 600 – a three- to 12-fold difference (National Health Services Commission 
1944). 
 
More than fifty years later disparities persist, with significant discrepancies between rich 
and poor. In the city of Cape Town, located in one of the richest regions in the country, the 
infant mortality rate illustrates the divide: In the wealthier city bowl, the IMR for 1998 was 
recorded as eight, whilst the figure for a large peri-urban informal settlements on the fringe 
of the city was 60 – a difference of nearly eight-fold (Shung-King, Abrahams, Giese, 
Guthrie, Hendricks, Hussey, Irlam, Jacobs & Proudlock 2000).  
 
Differences between regions, or provinces, show a similar pattern. The wealthier Western 
Cape Province has an IMR of 30, while its poorer neighbour, the Eastern Cape Province, 
has double that rate, with an IMR of 61.   
 
Similar patterns of inequality between urban and rural areas and between richer and poorer 
provinces are reflected across other child health indicators and are also evident in health 
service provision and access to health care. Disparities in immunisation coverage, an 
internationally accepted index of health service access for children, demonstrate this. In the 
most recent South African Health and Demographic Survey (1998), immunisation coverage 




ranged from only 50% in the province with the lowest coverage to a maximum of 81% in 
the province with the best coverage (Department of Health 1998). Results from a study on 
how prepared clinics are to respond to basic health service interventions for children with 
HIV corroborated this pattern of disparity in relation to provision of health care (Giese & 
Hussey 2002). Their investigation showed that most clinics surveyed were not equipped to 
provide basic interventions such as micronutrient supplementation with Vitamin A, 
prevention of tuberculosis and prevention of associated infections through treatment with 
co-trimoxazole. The unavailability of such basic interventions impacts on the quality of care 
that child health services can provide.   
 
Given the numerous and varied determinants of health, a multi-dimensional approach is 
required to ensure that children’s rights to health are met, and to ensure their long-term 
survival and development. Many of the underlying determinants of health relate to the 
provision of basic social services such as water, sanitation, food and shelter as well as safe 
environments. This is evidenced by the fact that the major killers of children under five 
years are still easily preventable diseases such as diarrhoea and respiratory infections, with 
malnutrition and HIV infections being important contributory causes. For older children, 
deaths from the major killer – trauma – point to the need for safety for pedestrians, better 
transport and traffic regulation, firearm control and safer environments in general 
(Bradshaw et al 2003).  
 
Although the response to children’s health needs requires an intersectoral approach, the 
health sector nevertheless has a critical role to play in providing appropriate health service 
interventions for children that cover health promotion, prevention, cure and rehabilitation. It 
also has a duty to ensure that the appropriate services are available, that such services are 
accessible, and that they are of sufficient quality to address the health needs of children.  
 
The first decade of post-apartheid South Africa focused on improving the provision of and 
access to social services. To reduce the legacy of inequality, and in the spirit of promoting a 
“better life for all” 1, a number of social interventions focusing on the poor and marginal 
groups were instituted under the Redistribution and Development Programme (RDP). 
Children, women and the disabled were key vulnerable groups identified (Republic of South 
Africa 1994).   
 
In the health sector, an extensive clinic building and upgrading programme targeted the 
needs of rural communities as a marginal group.  
 
The RDP made several additional, explicit commitments towards children’s health. These 
included the provision of free health care to children under six years of age and pregnant 
and lactating women, and the Primary School Nutrition Programme (PSNP). These 
programmes were seen to target different vulnerable groups with specific interventions. 
 
The strategy of free health care was conceptualised as key to improving access to health 
care for young children and pregnant and lactating mothers, whilst the PSNP, on the other 
hand, was focused on improving the nutritional status of children of school-going age, thus 
contributing to improving educational outcomes in children. Both these programmes are 
good examples of the health sector’s efforts to direct specific interventions to vulnerable 
groups of children through targeting. 
                                                 
1 This was the African National Congress (ANC) election manifesto for the first democratic elections in South Africa in 
1994. 




3. Free health care for children in South Africa 
3.1 South Africa’s health system  
General 
In 1994, South Africa embarked on a process of major political transformation – from an 
apartheid-driven system of inequity and inequality to a democratic dispensation aimed at 
redress. Within this process of change, health sector transformation was an important 
component.  
 
One of the major legacies of apartheid was a health system fragmented into 14 different 
departments, lacking cohesion and co-ordination, and with spending of close to 70% on 
expensive hospitals concentrated in large cities. The country had relatively poor primary 
level care facilities, which were often the only form of health care available to poor rural 
communities. The challenges of change were further compounded by the existence of an 
expensive and strong private health care system that served fewer than 20% of South 
Africans. Health sector reform thus involved changes in the structure, budgeting and 
functioning of the overall health system. 
 
An important first step was therefore aimed at building a single national health system with 
the purpose of reducing disparity in access, promoting equity in health and health care and 
increasing availability, affordability and the quality of care across the country. Such a 
unitary system would also provide a bridge to collaboration with other development sectors 
with responsibility for addressing the underlying determinants of health, such as water, 
sanitation, food and housing.  
 
The main intention of the transformation process was to change the health system from a 
very curative, hospital-centred system to one underpinned by the primary health care (PHC) 
philosophy, the principles of which are equity, accessibility, availability and affordability. It 
prescribes a comprehensive continuum of promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative and 
palliative care, with good communication and referral channels between the different levels 
and components. The approach also promotes the delivery of integrated health services, 
rather than fragmented health care delivered in vertical programmes. This facilitates 
delivery of holistic care, at one site, and at all times.  
 
These changes have resulted in a single national health system, with national and provincial 
departments co-ordinated through clear policy and budgetary arrangements and a strong 
commitment to decentralisation to the district in an effort to promote access to health care 
for all. A strong emphasis was placed on disbanding all vertical services rendered at 
primary level facilities in favour of a comprehensive integrated service delivered at the 
primary level facilities.  
 
Previously, vertical health services such as school health services, family planning and 
mental health services were integrated into the workload of nurses and doctors who staffed 
primary level facilities and required existing staff to equip themselves to deliver a full range 
of services to adults and children. This coincided with the advent of free health care. Thus, 
while the provision of free health services for children was identified for special attention 
within the overall health system, the challenges facing the broader health system also 
impacted on the capacity and quality of health services to children.   
 
 




Child health services  
Since 1994, the health sector adopted the spirit of the nation’s commitments to children, and 
implemented the major child health service mandate of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme regarding free health care for children under six years. At the same time, through a 
process of restructuring at both national and provincial levels, directorates for Maternal, Child 
and Women’s Health (MCWH) were established. The purpose of these directorates was to 
oversee the overall delivery of health services to children; to develop and implement child 
health policies, programmes and services; and to monitor child health status and health service 
delivery.  
 
Services for children were and are delivered at all three levels of health care. Primary level 
services for children, referring to the first level of care, largely include health promotion and 
preventive and basic curative care. In the public sector, primary level facilities include clinics, 
community health centres that function either during normal working hours or on a 24-hour 
basis, and district hospitals. Clinics are the backbone of primary level service provision in the 
public sector. They exist in various configurations and various proportions across provinces.  
 
Prior to 1994, clinics largely rendered preventive and health promotion services and fell under 
the jurisdiction of various local authorities across the country. Clinics were either fixed or 
mobile. Clinic services were nurse-driven and were rendered free of charge, with a nominal fee 
charged for certain drugs, primarily for adults. Preventive activities for children that included 
immunisation, growth monitoring and developmental screening were rendered free of charge. 
Post-1994, clinics were given increasing responsibility for handling curative cases as well and 
now render a full spectrum of health promotion, preventive and curative care for children and 
adults. Only serious illnesses requiring attention from doctors, trauma cases and chronic 
conditions for children are not managed at clinic level.  
 
Community health centres (also known as ‘day hospitals’ in some areas) and district hospitals 
focus primarily on first level curative care, meaning curative care that does not require complex 
or specialist interventions. These facilities are staffed by general practitioners, nurses and allied 
staff. District hospitals are the first level of hospital care where in-patient facilities, and facilities 
for surgical procedures that do not require a specialist, exist. The presence of district hospitals 
varies from province to province. For example, provinces such as Limpopo have a fairly 
extensive network of district hospitals (pers. comm. Dr. A. Robertson, February 2005), whereas 
the Western Cape metropolitan area has only two district hospitals with a larger network of 
regional (second level) hospitals instead. Prior to 1994, both community health centres and 
district hospitals charged user fees for all children according to a sliding scale based on family 
income. 
 
More serious or complex conditions requiring specialist care and/or further investigation are 
referred to secondary level facilities (the next level up from the primary level that handles 
slightly more complicated cases requiring hospital care or further investigation) or tertiary level 
facilities (hospitals that offer highly specialised care and investigations, such as the Red Cross 
Children’s Hospital). Secondary and tertiary level hospitals are integral parts of the delivery of 
health services to children and form a referral continuum with primary level facilities.  
 
Access to, and quality of, secondary and tertiary level hospitals vary, depending on where 
children live. For example, intensive care is fairly inaccessible to most children living in areas 
that are far away from the large cities where such care exists. Furthermore, treatment for certain 
chronic conditions is almost non-existent in the more rural provinces of the country (pers. 
comm. Dr. A. Robertson, February 2005). Prior to 1994, secondary and tertiary hospitals also 
charged user fees to all children based on a family income-dependent sliding scale. In addition, 
referral letters from primary level facilities were required to gain access to hospitals. In the 




absence of primary level facilities in a particular area – or sometimes based on client preference 
– the outpatient departments of hospitals performed primary level functions as patients accessed 
these departments for fairly minor ailments. This resulted in expensive resources being used to 
treat minor ailments, and this in itself warranted change (Shung-King 1998).  
 
3.2 The notion of free health care 
A key aspect within the health system transformation process that lent itself to immediate 
attention was that of addressing the accessibility and availability of health care services. 
Whilst many barriers to accessing health care existed, these two aspects were imminently 
remediable. The removal of user fees, whilst on the one hand a ‘technical’ intervention to 
improve health service access, was also a strong political statement of a changing political, 
economic and health care philosophy in post-apartheid South Africa.  
 
The provision of free health care to improve access was complemented by an extensive 
clinic building and upgrading programme through the RDP to address the health care 
services discrepancies that existed between rural and urban areas. 
 
Debates on the principle of free health care, as part of a health system philosophy 
emphasising health promotion and improving access to the poor and marginalised majority, 
have been taking place over a period of five decades in the country. It was first articulated 
in a ground-breaking report of the National Health Services Commission of 1944, headed by 
the first nationalist Minister of Health, Dr. Henry Gluckmann (National Health Services 
Commission 1944). Widespread recommendations were made towards improving health 
care for “native” South Africans in an attempt to reduce the extreme disparities that existed, 
for example the widely differing infant mortality rates of 50 per 1,000 live births for Whites 
and “somewhere between 150 and 600 per 1,000 live births” for Africans. Not surprisingly, 
Gluckmann’s progressive report and recommendations were rejected by the government of 
the day.  
The desire to ensure free health care for all as a means of attaining equal health and human 
rights for all South Africans was further expressed in the Freedom Charter of 1955, the 
blueprint for a politically free South African society. The Freedom Charter stipulated that 
“free medical care and hospitalisation shall be provided for all, with special care for 
mothers and young children” and furthermore stated that “a preventive health scheme shall 
be run by the state” (Congress of the People 1955). These sentiments were much in keeping 
with those expressed by Gluckmann a decade earlier.  
In the 1980s, a groundswell of political activity within the health sector emerged with the 
establishment of several progressive and alternate health sector unions and non-
governmental organisations. Debates on the responsibility of the health sector in terms of 
child health took on added dimensions as children were detained and physically assaulted 
by the apartheid regime. Debates on alternatives to the highly inequitable health care at the 
time raised important issues regarding the ‘triple A’s’ in health care: Availability, 
Accessibility, Affordability. Debates also focused on quality of care. The formation of the 
Progressive Primary Health Care network in 1987, founded on the philosophy of the Alma-
Ata Primary Health Care declaration of 1978, started providing alternative aspirations for a 
heath care system that focused on prevention; recognised all levels of care, including 
community-based health care, as an important continuum; strived towards accessible and 
affordable health care for all and recognised the need to advance the health rights of the 




most vulnerable members of society, such as children and women – especially those living 
in poverty.  
In the early nineties, many progressive health workers and organisations were instrumental 
in putting together the ANC’s National Health Plan for South Africa. This plan was to 
provide the foundation for the White Paper on the Transformation of the Health System in 
South Africa, published as a forerunner to a new National Health Act. The ANC’s health 
plan suggested that, “health care be provided free of charge in the public sector for children 
under 6, pregnant and nursing mothers, the elderly, disabled and certain categories of the 
chronically ill” (African National Congress 1994). The plan did not indicate the level and 
type of public sector facilities where such free care would be provided.  
There was pressure on the newly-elected democratic government to manifest evidence of 
delivery as early as possible. A key message in the ANC’s election manifesto was the 
promise to deliver, with immediate effect, certain key interventions through the RDP. The 
programme intended to redress past imbalances created by apartheid and address the 
priority needs of the nation. The RDP contained a number of national goals for children to 
enhance their survival, protection and development. Amongst health priorities for children 
that appeared in the RDP was the provision of free health care for children under six years 
and for pregnant women. Coupled with this was the plan to upgrade old and build new 
clinics extensively, with a special focus on rural areas.  
 
Exactly 50 years after the Gluckmann recommendations, on 24 May 1994, the first 
democratically-elected president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, announced his 
government’s top priorities for his first 100 days in office through a series of presidential-
led programmes. The announcement included the declaration of free health care, effective 
from 1 June 1994, for children under six years of age and pregnant and lactating women.  
 
The underlying rationale for the declaration was that children under six years were the most 
vulnerable in terms of disease and death, as children under five years of age and especially 
children under one year had the highest death rates. Similarly, by providing free care to 
pregnant mothers, the health of newborns would improve considerably as there is strong 
correlation between regular antenatal visits and quality perinatal care and the health status 
of and mortality and morbidity outcomes for newborns. Improving access to antenatal care 
for pregnant women is also critical in reducing maternal mortality, which in turn benefits 
the long-term health of children. In addition, almost one fifth of all pregnancies occur in 
teenagers; hence such older children would benefit from having improved access to 
antenatal care, as well as from better access for their babies. This is important given the 
high risk of pregnancy complications in teenagers. Thus, the removal of user fees as a 
barrier to accessing health care was seen as an important step towards improving health 
services for children. 
 
The policy took effect on 1 June 1994 and was announced in the Government Gazette 
Notice 657 of 1994 (Republic of South Africa 1994). Free health care was literally an 
overnight institution at public sector health services and was made available to the specified 














State health care facilities, which include hospitals, community health centres, 
clinics, mobile clinics and satellite clinics. 
State-aided hospitals that receive more than half of their expenditure in 
subsidies from the State. 
District surgeons (Although there are some full-time ‘district surgeons’ who 
provide medico-legal and other services, the majority are private, general 
practitioners working in rural areas and who also provide mainly curative 
services to ‘state patients’ on a part-time basis and are reimbursed by the 
government for these services.) 
The policy however excludes persons (and their dependants) who are members of medical 
aid schemes and non-South African citizens who visit South Africa specifically for the 
purpose of obtaining health care. 
Pregnant women (of whom approximately one-fifth are teenagers/children) are eligible for 
free health care at the specified facilities from the time of diagnosing the pregnancy, or if a 
pregnancy complication has developed, for up to 42 days after the termination of the 
pregnancy or until such time that the complication has been cured or the condition 
stabilised.  
There are no specific stipulations regarding the type of conditions that render children or 
pregnant women eligible for free health care, and not any limitations on the level at which 
such free health care would be provided. Thus, these groups are eligible for free care at 
primary, secondary and tertiary levels of health care.  
The free health care declaration departed somewhat from the original intention, which was 
to make primary level health care free, to make the treatment of children with referral letters 
to hospitals free, and that user fees at hospitals were still to apply where children bypassed 
the system. The rationale of the original intention was that users would seek care at the 
appropriate level and be discouraged from going straight to a hospital for conditions that 
could easily be treated at lower levels of care. The downside of this approach was that in the 
most marginalised and poor areas, primary level facilities were often unavailable and the 
hospital was, in many instances, the first level of health service. 
The second phase following free health care to children under six and pregnant women was 
announced in April 1996 in a parliamentary budget debate, when health care for all citizens, 
regardless of their income, was declared free, with similar provisions as above, but only at 
the primary level of care. This meant that all children thus benefited from free health care at 
primary level facilities, but still had to pay at hospitals. 
The third phase was announced on 1 July 2003 by the Minister of Health, Dr. Manto 
Tshabalala-Msimang. This announcement made provision for free health care for people 
with moderate and severe disabilities. The conditions for children were similar to those that 
originally applied to children under six years, where children of any age with moderate to 
severe disabilities could attend all health services free of charge. There was however a lack 
of clarity as to whether this included the provision of assistive devices. This provision only 
refers to children with specific physical and mental disabilities and does not include other 
chronic conditions such as asthma, diabetes and HIV, for example.   




In July 2004, exactly 10 years after health care was first declared free for children under six 
years and pregnant women, the new National Health Act of 2004 was enacted after several 
years of deliberations on its provisions. This law legally binds the Department of Health to 
provide free health care for children under six years and pregnant women at all the facilities 
as specified in the original declaration, as well as for all citizens using public sector primary 
level facilities. This will remain until this Act is either amendment to the contrary or 
repealed.  
 
The waiving of user fees in the public health sector, as a means of improving access to 
health services for especially the poor, can thus be classified as a universal mechanism at 
the primary health care level, while targeting at the hospital level of care continue according 
to targeting criteria such as age and the presence of moderate to severe disabilities. It is also 
an example of a phased-in mechanism (or progressive realisation) where its original 
targeting was based on age and condition as indicators of vulnerability (pregnancy being the 
‘condition’), irrespective of health needs and level of care. This was later extended to 
include level of care and the presence of specified disabilities. At secondary and tertiary 
hospital levels, a means test for children six years and older without moderate or severe 
disabilities and who are not covered by any form of medical aid, is applied. This means test 
is based on family income, with charges for children based on a pre-determined sliding 
scale. The current application of free health care is illustrated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The current provision of free health care to children by level of care 
 
Level of health care 
 
 
Children under six years 
 
Children 6 – 18 
Primary level facilities 
(clinics, community health 





Free for all children, unless 
their family’s income is more 
than R100,000 per annum or 





Free for all children, unless 
their family’s income is more 
than R100,000 per annum or 
they are covered by a medical 
aid.  
Free for children with 
moderate to severe 
disabilities. All other children 
have to pay according to a 
means-tested sliding scale 
based on family income if not 
covered by medical aid. 
Children on medical aid have 
to pay according to specified 
medical aid rates. 
 
3.3 Implementation  
Current service practices 
The original free health care policy for children under six years and pregnant women, as 
well as the policy on free primary level care for all citizens, are working well in the sense 
that none of these groups are required to pay user fees. Thus the policy is implemented 
appropriately.   
 
However, hospital practices in terms of user fees seem to vary for children older than six 
years. This was revealed in a snapshot of current user-fee practices at hospitals across three 
provinces and at different levels of service delivery, undertaken for the purposes of writing 
this paper. District, regional and tertiary level hospitals in each of the three provinces were 
asked about their user-fee practices with regard to children.  
 




Some hospitals use a sliding scale based on the income of the caregivers to determine the 
user fees (pers. comm., fees clerk at Red Cross Children’s Hospital, 2005). Other hospitals 
charge a flat rate that varies from facility to facility.  
 
It was indicated at all the facilities2 that children under six years who are not covered by a 
medical aid can access the facility free of charge. Children older than six years are charged 
according to a fee sliding scale, based on the annual family income. The sliding scale varies 
between secondary and tertiary hospitals. The minimum amount charged for hospital user 
fees ranged from R8 to open a patient folder, with everything free thereafter, to R13 for an 
outpatient visit and R26 in total for an admission of fewer than 30 days. Hospital 
superintendents appeared uncertain as to whether children with moderate and severe 
disabilities who require assistive devices will have to pay for those devices. From their 
responses it seems that a fee is charged for assistive devices. This requires further 
exploration.  
 
An example of a fee sliding scale used by a large, tertiary children’s hospital is displayed in 
Box 1. 
 
Box 1: Example of a fee sliding scale for children at a tertiary level children’s hospital 
Children under six years are treated completely free of charge if not covered by a medical aid 
fund or if the income of the family does not exceed R100,000 per annum. 
 
Four income categories exist, namely categories H0, H1, H2 and H3/private. Income is 
assessed as combined gross family income of the parent(s) or primary caregiver(s). Proof of 
income has to be submitted. 
 
H0: Caregivers with children older than six years and who fall into this category do not have to 
pay. The category includes families where caregivers are formally unemployed and supported 
by the Unemployment Insurance Fund. Proof of unemployment has to be provided. In addition, 
caregivers of children that receive social welfare grants such as the Child Support Grant, the 
Care Dependency Grant, the Single Care Grant and Maintenance Grants are exempt from 
paying fees. Children who are dependent on adults who get social pensions such as the Old 
Age Pension are also classified as H0 candidates.  
 
H1: Combined family income of R0 – R50,000. Such children are charged a flat rate fee. Fees, 
as from 1 January 2005, are R70. This fee thus doubled from R35 in 2004.  
 
H2: Combined family income of R50,000 – 100,000. They are charged a service rate plus 50% 
of the full uniform patient fee schedule (UPFS) charges that include consultation and all 
procedures. The service rate for 2005 is R235 per visit, excluding services and procedures. 
 
H3: Combined family income of R100,000 or greater, or if children are covered by medical aid.  
Service fee per visit, excluding services and procedures, is R338. Full costs of consultation and 
procedures are charged. 
Source: Personal. communication. Mr. Poggenpoel, Fees Office,  
Red Cross Children’s Hospital, Cape Town, February 2005. 
 
All the hospitals denied ever turning away children whose caregivers were unable to pay. 
Yet, children and caregivers had varying experiences in this regard, as indicated in research 
                                                 
2 Western Cape facilities included the Red Cross Children’s Hospital, Eben Donges Hospital in Worcester and Wesfleur 
Hospital in Atlantis. Eastern Cape facilities included Frere Hospital in East London and Frontier Hospital in 
Queenstown. Northern Cape facilities included the Kimberley hospital complex, Gordonia Hospital in Upington and 
Calvinia Hospital in Calvinia 
 




conducted on the health and social needs of orphans and vulnerable children in the context 
of HIV/AIDS (Giese, Meintjes, Croke & Chamberlain 2003). A number of children and 
caregivers reported being turned away from hospitals if they did not have the required fee. 
A service provider at a large tertiary level hospital confirmed this in his observation that, 
“despite the emphatic denial of any child being turned away, admission clerks do turn 
children away if their caregivers or parents are not able to pay” (pers. comm. P. Jeena, 
2002). Anecdotally it appears that there are instances where children who are not able to 
afford the hospital fees sometimes delay attendance at the risk of their condition getting 
worse. This situation is potentially worse for children living in households where there is a 
total absence of adult caregivers and when health workers are not prepared to see young 
children that are not accompanied by an adult. 
 
Despite the fact that user fees have been removed as a barrier to access to health care at the 
primary level, circumstances and practice suggest that user fees at hospital level may still 
provide a barrier to access. In addition, other barriers to access remain. Giese et al (2003) 
found in their research that poor children living with sick and dying caregivers are often 
unable to access health services for a number of reasons. Some of these include: 
• A lack of services in rural and informal settlements. 
• Specific health interventions not being available at health facilities. A rapid 
appraisal of primary health care services (Giese & Hussey 2002) showed that 
essential health interventions for children infected with HIV were not available in 
the majority of clinics throughout the country.  
• Grandmothers and older caregivers not knowing about mandatory, essential health 
services for young children, such as the immunisation programme. 
• Unaccompanied children, in the context of children living without adult caregivers, 
being turned away from health services. 
• Medicines not being readily available to children who need it. 
• Significant transport costs to get to health facilities.  
 
The government’s commitment to provide free health care for children remains a step in the 
right direction, but the follow-through in addressing other barriers to access remains a 
challenge. This for example includes the provision or subsidisation of transport to and from 
health facilities in areas where such facilities are situated far from communities; the 
provision of child-friendly services where children are appropriately prioritised and 
correctly-trained staff, medication, support services and referral mechanisms exist; and 
where sufficient budgetary allocations are made to ensure the provision of good quality 













Evaluation of free health care  
A year after free health care for children under six years and pregnant women was 
implemented, the Health Systems Trust commissioned a national evaluation of the 
implementation. The study was undertaken by the Child Health Unit at the University of 
Cape Town (McCoy 1996). The evaluation was conducted at numerous facilities across four 
provinces, with such facilities operating at different levels within the health system. Key 
findings from this and other evaluations are outlined below. 
 
a. Health service utilisation 
The evaluation by McCoy showed that the policy indeed did have an impact on the 
utilisation of health care services by young children and pregnant women. In this study 
utilisation data was collected from numerous health facilities (clinics, mobile clinics and 
hospitals) across four provinces and average monthly attendances compared for the 12 
months immediately before and 12 months immediately after the introduction of the policy.  
 
A significant increase in utilisation of public health facilities by pregnant women and 
children under six years occurred, suggesting that the practice of user fees did act as a 
deterrent to people accessing public sector services before they were abolished. The 
attendance figures 12 months before and after the policy was introduced showed a general 
increase of between 20% and 60%. The increase exceeded 100% in only a few facilities. 
This increase in attendance was not universal, as a few facilities showed no increase and a 
few actually experienced a drop in attendance. In most facilities though, both the number 
and proportion of paediatric patients increased.  
 
The analysis showed that the utilisation of both outpatient and antenatal units increased at 
most facilities. In facilities where antenatal clinic attendance and booking visits increased, a 
rise of up to 16% for booking visits and 20% for antenatal clinic visits were recorded. No 
significant differences were found between utilisation in rural areas compared to urban 
areas. An interesting finding from the Alexandra health centre in Gauteng Province, where 
paediatric outpatients continued to be charged R5 for visits for 16 months after the 
introduction of the policy, was that it showed only a slight rise in patient numbers. In 
contrast, the clinics surrounding Alexandra showed increases in attendances immediately 
after the policy was introduced, hence reiterating the impact of user fees on patients’ ability 
to access the service. 
 
A subsequent national evaluation of free maternal care in South Africa suggested that there 
was a general increase in antenatal attendance in eight out of the 13 sites that were included 
in the study, and a mean increase of 14.9% across all sites (Schneider & Gilson 1997). A 
more in-depth study undertaken in the Soweto area for 32 months post-free primary health 
care showed an initial increase but thereafter a drop in attendance to levels lower than those 
pre-free health care. The authors further suggest that the provision of free health care seems 
to have increased the demand for curative care at primary level, which crowds out the 
ability of nursing staff to engage in preventive health activities. The free health care policy 
thus comes at a price.  
 
A localised evaluation in the Hlabisa area of KwaZulu-Natal Province was conducted in a 
similar fashion to the study undertaken by McCoy. This evaluation examined the attendance 
of under-six-year-olds for a 30-month period before the introduction of free primary level 
care through to an 18-month period after the introduction of the policy (Wilkinson, Sach & 
Abdool Karim 1997). This evaluation also compared the proportions of children referred to 




hospitals during the two periods. The evaluation showed an increase in the use of curative 
services by children, but not of preventative services, as the latter have always been free. 
 
The McCoy evaluation showed that the referral rate to hospitals decreased, suggesting that 
the health problems that children presented with were either of a mild nature or that, due to 
earlier presentations, fewer complicated cases arose that did not require hospital care. There 
appears to have been a rise in “inappropriate” presentations at hospital level, but not at 
clinic level. The hospital statistics were not conclusive. In-patient paediatric admissions as a 
total proportion of all admissions at all hospitals increased, suggesting that more children 
that were ill enough to be admitted were identified and referred within the health system.  
 
The evaluation further showed that attendance for curative care at a network of mobile 
service points reportedly increased by 93%, while antenatal attendance decreased by 20%. 
This further supports the point made by Schneider & Gilson that preventive activities were 
being sacrificed in favour of curative care. 
 
An interesting finding of the evaluation was the demonstrated impact of other factors on 
health service utilisation, such as endemic violence, hospital strikes and the national 
elections, as concomitant sharp drops in attendances were observed during the months when 
these activities occurred. 
 
A serious deficiency in available evaluation results is the absence of empirical data on 
whether the poorest have preferentially benefited in terms of increased utilisation from the 
free health care policies. On the one hand, it is likely that the lowest income groups have 
benefited from free health care, given that these groups use public sector services more 
extensively than higher income groups, who often choose to use private providers. The 
explicit exclusion of medical scheme members from free health care is also likely to have 
limited leakage of benefits to the non-poor. On the other hand, the removal of user fees does 
not remove all obstacles to accessing public health services. Given that the most vulnerable 
will find it particularly difficult to overcome these obstacles to access, it is possible that the 
utilisation may have increased disproportionately among the least vulnerable within low-
income groups. Thus, the precise benefit incidence of the free care policies should be 
established. 
 
Furthermore, none of the evaluations addressed the possible impact of free health care on 
child health outcomes. This is possibly due to the fact that health outcomes are dependent 
on many other factors and that it would be difficult, at the best of times, to show any direct 
causal relationship between free health care and health outcomes.  
 
No other national evaluations that examined the possible changes in service utilisation by 
children beyond the first year of the implementation of the policy were found. 
 
b. Health worker and health service user perceptions of the policy 
The McCoy evaluation demonstrated general public support for the policy, but a general 
negative feeling towards the policy by health workers. Responses from health workers 
indicated that there were many ambiguous feelings on the free health care policy (McCoy 
1996). On the positive side, health workers did feel that the policy promoted the general 
health of the population, benefited poor and malnourished children and prevented serious 
illness and death in children and pregnant women.  
 




A more in-depth study of nurses’ views on the implementation of various health policies, 
including the free health care policy, supported many of the points highlighted by McCoy 
(Walker & Gilson 2004). Nurses felt that the implementation of free health care was 
rewarding for them personally and that they felt more “professionally fulfilled as a result of 
the free care policy” due to the knowledge that they were “able to help more people in the 
community, were able to improve their diagnostic skills and gain professional experience”.  
 
McCoy found that users of health services generally supported the policy and felt that 
access was improved for marginalised groups such as those living in rural areas, informal 
settlements and workers on White-owned farms. The popularity of the policy with the 
public was also reiterated in the Hlabisa evaluation.  
 
However, many negative feelings towards the policy were expressed by health workers. 
One of the key reasons for these feelings expressed was that many health workers first 
heard of the policy through the media. In addition, they were not consulted about their 
experiences of the initial policy before it was extended to all persons at a primary level, and 
felt discontented that they were not involved in the planning and implementation of the 
policy. They also felt that it was imposed on them without a proper assessment of available 
resources and capacities.  
 
Health workers further questioned the availability of funds for the provision of free health 
care, with no money apparently available to improve their salaries and conditions of service. 
They felt that the free health care policy aggravated a number of existing problems within 
health care facilities such as staff shortages, poor working conditions, poor staff morale and 
shortage of medicines. In the Walker and Gilson evaluation, health workers expressed 
strong views on the negative impact of the policy on them as health workers, citing that 
shortages of resources such as equipment made it difficult to operate in their working 
environment. The interviewees did not have a problem with the principle of the policy, but 
certainly with the poor planning and preparation that accompanied its implementation. They 
also felt that patients do not value services that they don’t pay for. The Hlabisa evaluation 
(Wilkinson et al 1997) reiterated previous findings in other studies, such as that staff in 
clinics and hospitals are overworked and stressed by the increased workload. 
 
c. Impact of free health care on drugs and other resources 
The impact of free health care on drug expenditure was inconsistent and difficult to 
interpret in the McCoy evaluation. There were no consistent trends between different types 
of facilities, geographical areas or levels of care. Some facilities showed a real increase in 
drug expenditure of between 4% and 99%, whilst others showed a real decrease of between 
4% and 34%. It was difficult to attribute these changes to free health care provision, as 
provinces were not able to provide breakdowns of their drug expenditure by level of care. 
Drug expenditure for selected tracer drugs that are mostly used at primary level showed an 
increase in expenditure of 17% for micronutrient supplements to 92% for a commonly-used 
antibiotic. The qualitative responses by nurses in the Walker and Gilson evaluation strongly 
suggested frequent instances where drugs were not available and equipment unavailable or 
not working – leaving nurses feeling disempowered and unable to do their jobs properly. 
They did recognise, however, that these problems were systemic rather than the effect of a 
single policy. 
 
McCoy demonstrated a small loss of revenue to the public sector to the order of less than 
5%, which, in the face of the overall health budget, is relatively insignificant. 




Despite the challenges that were highlighted in the various studies, free health care at the 
primary level was subsequently extended as described earlier, with little visible effort to 
address the systemic problems of health worker stress primarily due to patient overload and 
problems with drug and equipment supplies. No subsequent evaluations, aside from Walker 
and Gilson’s evaluation of health worker perceptions, were undertaken after the extension 
of free health care to all at primary level, and to the disabled. 
 
Despite the significant increase in primary health care budgets/expenditure before and 
during the first and second phases of the introduction of free health care, the main problem 
was that the policy was implemented almost with immediate effect during both phases, 
giving health workers little time to plan adequately for implementation and to stockpile 
drugs in anticipation of increases in utilisation. Thus, the problem of poor implementation 
processes, highlighted by McCoy as well as Walker and Gilson, was perpetuated.  
 
Health budget trends of relevance to the introduction of free health care 
Without careful planning for the implementation of a health policy, there can be adverse 
consequences for the health system. Appropriate planning includes adequate consultation 
with front line health workers and the mobilisation of support from them, as well as the 
provision of adequate financial and other resources to close any gap arising from declining 
fee revenue and increased utilisation. It is therefore important to review changes in the 
allocation of budgetary resources to the South African health system around the time of the 
introduction of free health care policies to assess the extent to which resource 
supplementation considerations were taken into account. While it is impossible with 
existing information systems to consider whether or not additional resources were made 
available towards health services for young children and pregnant women, it is possible to 
evaluate trends in primary health care expenditure. 
 
A recent evaluation of trends in publicly-funded primary health care services found that 
expenditure on these services increased by an average of 15% per annum in real terms (i.e. 
after inflation has been taken into account) over the period 1992/933 to 1996/97 (Okorafor, 
Thomas & McIntyre 2003). This indicates that there was a dramatic prioritisation of 
funding for primary health care services after the first democratic elections in 1994, even 
before free primary care services were introduced for the general population on 1 April 
1996 (i.e. at the start of the 1996/97 financial year). There was a further real increase of 
16% in primary care spending in 1997/98 compared with that in 1996/97, but there was a 
7% decline in real expenditure in 1998/99 and almost no change (0.2% real increase) in 
1999/2000. This was largely attributable to stagnation of the overall government health 
budget during this period.  
 
Thereafter, expenditure began to increase gradually in real terms again, but at a much 
slower rate that in the mid-1990s. A similar trend is evident (see Figure 1 on the next page) 
when real expenditure is considered in per capita terms (relative to the population 
dependent on publicly-financed health services, i.e. after removing those covered by 
medical schemes). Due to the fact that the population grew over this period, declines in the 
per capita trend are more pronounced and increases less impressive than when merely 
focusing on expenditure changes. It is appropriate to consider expenditure trends in relation 
to the population, excluding those covered by medical schemes, given that this group is 
                                                 
3 The 1992/93 data are based on the first comprehensive Health Expenditure Review undertaken in South Africa, and 
care was taken to ensure comparability of these data with those in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 




explicitly excluded from eligibility for free health care. In addition, it is well established 
that medical scheme beneficiaries very seldom use public sector primary care services. 
 



























Sources: Okorafor et al (2003); data for 1992/93 from McIntyre, Bloom, Doherty & Brijlal (1995);  
data for 1993/94 to 1995/96 not available; data for 1996/97 to 2002/03 from National Treasury (2003). 
 
It is encouraging that significant additional resources were directed towards supporting 
primary health care services before and during the introduction of the free health care 
policy. Real per capita expenditure on these services almost doubled over a period of six 
years. This particularly would have assisted in employing additional staff within existing 
and new primary care facilities, which would have eased the burden of sudden increases in 
utilisation after the introduction of free primary care services. However, it is of concern that 
expenditure levels were not sustained at this level and in fact declined quite significantly in 
real per capita terms over a three-year period (1997/98 to 2000/01).  Although expenditure 
increased again in the early 2000s, it has not yet returned to the real per capita levels 
experienced in 1997/98. This likely has adverse implications for sustaining the 
improvements in access to primary health care services promoted by the free care policy. 
 
It is also important to note that there are considerable disparities in the level of publicly-
funded primary health care expenditure between provinces (see Table 2 on the following 
page). The poorest provinces (Mpumalanga, Limpopo, Eastern Cape, North West and 
KwaZulu-Natal) have the lowest levels of per capita expenditure. Expenditure in 
Mpumalanga is almost four times lower than in Gauteng. It is of considerable concern that 
those provinces where populations face the greatest geographic access constraints – and 
where they have the greatest need to access free health services given their dramatically 
lower ability to pay – are those which have the lowest levels of publicly-funded expenditure 
on these services. A recent modelling of the resource requirements to provide a 
comprehensive package of primary health care services indicates that about R300 per capita 
(in 2003/04 terms) would be the ‘ideal’ expenditure level (Chitha, Cleary, Davauid, 
Jikwana, Makan, Masilela, McIntyre, Pillay, Sebokedi, Thomas & Wilson 2004). All 
provinces are below this target, but the poorest provinces would need to experience four- to 








Table 2: Primary health care expenditure by province, 2002/03 
Province PHC expenditure per capita (Rands) 
Eastern Cape 89 





Northern Cape 187 
North West 138 
Western Cape 202 
National 143 
Source: Okorafor et al (2003); data derived from National Treasury (2003) 
 
In summary: While the growth in real public sector expenditure on primary health care 
services around the time of the removal of fees for these services would have supported 
the policy implementation process, this resource prioritisation has not been sustained. 
Of even greater concern is the continued differential in primary health care expenditure 
between provinces relative to the need for public sector health services, with the poorest 
population groups continuing to be faced with the most severely under-resourced 
primary health care services. 
 
4. The contrasting experience of other African countries 
charging for health services and free health care provision  
Given the South African experiences on free health care, it is useful to reflect on lessons 
and experiences from other countries to compare and contrast the strengths and challenges 
of providing free health care as a means of delivering more equitable health services for all. 
Despite the different political and macro-economic contexts in other African countries, the 
wealth of experiences from these countries highlight the pros and cons of user fees and their 
impact on user access, health service utilisation, health service workload and contribution to 
revenue generation for the health sector.  
 
In addition, very useful lessons on the impact of user fees on households have emerged. 
This is critical in understanding why there has been a recent surge of interest in the 
possibility of removing user fees among various African countries. The rationale for the 
introduction of free health care policies in South Africa was based on similar concerns 
about the adverse consequences of user fees raised in the following review of African 
experiences on health care provision. Although South Africa is an upper-middle income 
country and most other African countries fall in the low income country category, many 
residents of rural and peri-urban areas in South Africa are as impoverished as their 
counterparts in other African countries. They hence have similar experiences of the burden 
of having to pay for health services on an ‘out-of-pocket’ basis. The following section thus 




provides a comparative analysis of user-fee experiences from countries across Africa and 
sets the scene for briefly reviewing the recent removal of fees in Uganda and Kenya.  
 
4.1 Comparative analysis of user fees and their consequences in selected  
      African countries 
History, motivation and objectives of user-fee policies 
Some African countries, such as Ethiopia, Namibia and South Africa, have a long history of 
charging user fees for public sector health services (Gilson 1998). In contrast, many 
countries had a tradition of providing health services that are fully subsidised by the 
government, and only implemented user fees in the late 1980s. In the vast majority of 
African countries, any fees charged were nominal or ‘token’ and were not seen as a cost 
recovery mechanism.  However, by the mid-1990s, most African countries (28 of the 37 
countries surveyed by Nolan & Turbat 1995) had an explicit policy of charging non-token 
user fees for government health services. 
 
There were two major contributory factors to this rapid growth in user-fee policies in 
African countries. First, various international organisations vociferously advocated for the 
introduction of user fees (de Ferranti 1985; Akin, Birdsall & de Ferranti 1987; Jimenez 
1987; Vogel 1988). The World Bank was in a particularly strong position to influence 
policy in African countries as user fees and other cost-recovery mechanisms were often an 
integral part of World Bank loan conditions and associated Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs). Secondly, macro-economic difficulties in many countries (related to 
low or negative economic growth and increasing indebtedness) limited the resources 
available to governments for financing and providing health services (Bennett 1992; Gilson 
& Mills 1995). Government resources were seen as inadequate to meet the growing health 
needs of populations, and ways of recovering at least some of the costs of health services 
were seen as necessary. 
 
From the perspective of national governments, two objectives were most frequently used to 
justify the introduction of, or increase in, user fees. These were the objectives of generating 
revenue and improving the quality of public sector health services, particularly through the 
availability of medicines at facilities (Nolan & Turbat 1995). It was anticipated that user 
fees would generate significant revenue to cover the health care financing gap facing 
government health services in African countries. While in hindsight this proved to be 
wholly unrealistic, the generation of revenue was a key motivation and objective of 
charging user-fee policies.  
 
International institutions that favoured user fees as a cost-recovery mechanism also 
provided a range of other justifications and intended goals in adhering to this practice. They 
argued that user fees prevent unnecessary or ‘frivolous’ health service utilisation and send 
‘price signals’ to patients about the cost of services at different levels of care, thereby 
promoting appropriate use and adherence to referral mechanisms (de Ferranti 1985; Akin et 
al 1987; Griffin 1988). Another motivation was that health service providers are more likely 
to be responsive to patients’ needs and concerns and will provide good quality care when 
patients are paying for services. Finally, it was put forward that fees would promote equity 
as those who could afford to pay would ease the burden on the government, who in turn 
could concentrate its resources on the poor. However, as will be shown below, many of 
these argued ‘benefits’ of fees were neither realistic nor realisable. 




Consequences of user fees 
The consequences of user fees and free health care are best examined in terms of impact on 
health status; access to health services as measured by service utilisation; budgetary 
impacts, both at a micro or household level and at the macro level of government health 
budgets; and on health services.  
 
Very little, if any, data exists that can demonstrate a direct link between free health care and 
change in health status. Evaluations primarily concentrate on whether – and to what extent – 
access has improved, how the policy affected health service workload and health worker 
morale, and what the health budget implications were. Important work has been undertaken 
in terms of the consequences of user fees for the poor in general and for households 
specifically. The following sections reflect on some of the data from selected African 
countries.   
 
a. Revenue generation from user fees 
The reality of user-fee effects is very different from the argued ‘benefits’. Various studies 
indicate that fee revenue in African countries has ranged from less than 1% of recurrent 
government health care expenditure in Burkina Faso to nearly 15% in Ghana. The Ghanaian 
experience is exceptional by international standards and this level of revenue generation 
could not be sustained. As a result, it dropped to approximately 6% of recurrent expenditure 
in the 1990s (Nolan & Turbat 1995). On average, fees have tended to generate revenue of 
less than 5% of total operating costs (Creese 1991); although they may cover a sizeable 
proportion of non-salary operating costs (Creese & Kutzin 1995). However, these studies do 
not provide an indication of the collection and other fee-related administration costs which 
translate into even lower net revenue (Creese 1991). 
 
Revenue generating potential is also influenced by whether there are incentives for service 
providers to collect such fees (Vogel 1988; Shaw & Griffin 1995). If all revenue collected is 
returned to the Treasury or Ministry of Finance, there is no direct or visible benefit to the 
health sector; thus there is little incentive for fee collection (Mwabu & Mwangi 1986; 
Russell & Gilson 1995; Creese & Kutzin 1995). While revenue generation can be increased 
by the incentive that fees collected at local facilities could be used in improving the quality 
and/or the quantity of services, this may be in conflict with equity goals (Mwabu & Mwangi 
1986; Gertler, Locay & Sanderson 1987). The proportion of fee revenue retained at 
facilities influences the ability to redistribute resources to facilities that are under-funded, 
which tend to be those least likely to be able to generate their own revenue. Another adverse 
equity effect is that health care providers are less likely to exempt eligible patients from fees 
if health workers and their facility stand to benefit from the revenue generated. These 
adverse consequences arise when revenue generation goals are given priority over equity 
goals (Gilson, Kalyalya, Kuchler, Lake, Oranga & Ouendo 2001). 
 
b. Consequences of user fees in terms of efficiency in provision and use 
User fees can create perverse incentives for health care providers and lead to supplier-
induced demand. For example, certain schemes which prioritise fees on medicines – and 
which allow some of the fee revenue to be used for the payment of health workers’ salaries 
– provide an incentive to over-prescribe (Kanji 1989). 
 
There is limited evidence to support or refute the assumption that user fees can promote 
allocative efficiency by encouraging patients to use the correct referral route. This has 
occurred in some countries, such as Eritrea, which introduced a graduated fee system (i.e. 




low fees at primary care facilities and significantly higher fees at referral hospitals). The 
result was a dramatic drop in outpatient visits to referral hospitals, while health centre visits 
increased (Asbu 1999). However, in Zimbabwe it was found that the higher fee levels at 
referral facilities did not offset the tendency of patients to bypass primary care facilities. 
This is due to the higher perceived quality of care at referral facilities, which tend to have 
better medicine supplies and are staffed by doctors, and the fact that in some cases a referral 
hospital is the nearest facility (Hongoro, Musonza, Macq & Anozie 1998). Therefore, in 
order to achieve location efficiency objectives, an extensive network of high quality 
primary care facilities is required. 
 
c. Service utilisation consequences of user fees 
The consequences of introducing or increasing fees on the utilisation of health services have 
been extensively documented. Fees obviously tend to reduce utilisation as it places a 
financial burden on patients at the time of using a health service. Some argue that user fees 
will mainly prevent unnecessary or frivolous health service utilisation. However, this 
argument ignores the fact that most patients are not in a position to assess whether 
symptoms are serious or whether they can be ignored. It also does not recognise that the use 
of health services is seldom costless. Time, transport and other costs of obtaining health 
care can be significant and will already deter unnecessary utilisation (Abel-Smith & Rawal 
1992). In addition, there is no empirical evidence that fees particularly deter ‘frivolous’ use. 
Indeed, a study in Swaziland found that the most substantial decreases in utilisation 
following a fee increase were for essential health services such as immunisations (which are 
not necessarily regarded by communities as worthwhile paying for, given that there is no 
immediate or direct benefit) and care for children suffering from dehydration (Yoder 1989). 
 
The extent of decline in utilisation associated with user fees varies from country to country 
but there are very few examples of where fee introduction did not result in a decrease in 
utilisation. Kenya has the most extensive documentation on the development of user-fee 
policies and their effects, and their experiences are presented in Box 2 on the next page. 





Fees for government health services in Swaziland increased in the mid-1980s from 
US$0.25 to US$0.90 for curative services, with preventive services changed from 
being free to charging a fee of US$0.45.This resulted in a 17% decrease in average 
attendance at health facilities. About 34% of the overall decline in attendance was 
among patients who previously paid the least for health care (Yoder 1989). 
In South Africa there was a 9.2% decline in average attendances at a Cape Town 
day hospital (a curative, primary level facility) after a 50% increase in fees 
(Frankish 1986). Particular concern was expressed about the decline in attendance 
by hypertensive, diabetic and asthmatic patients, which was accompanied by an 
increase in hospital admissions among patients who were no longer attending 
regular chronic care clinics for monitoring and dispensing of medication supplies. 
The move from nominal fees to active cost recovery with ambitious revenue targets 
in Ghana (mid-1985) resulted in the utilisation of outpatient services declining by 
almost two-thirds nationally. Surveys in two regions found that, while utilisation 
returned to pre-fee levels by 1987 in urban areas, utilisation in rural areas did not 
recover by the end of the same year (Waddington & Enyimayew 1989a, 1989b). 
A district in Uganda that introduced fees (ranging from US$0.05 to US$0.50 at 
different facilities), with the revenue retained and managed at a community level, 




experienced an average of 21% decline in utilisation (Kipp, Kamugisha, Jacobs, 
Burnham & Rubaale 2001). 
• With the introduction of fees in Tanzania, utilisation levels at three government 
hospitals in Dar es Salaam that were primarily used by the poor dropped by 50% 
(Hussein & Mujinja 1997). 
 
Box 2: User-fee experiences in Kenya 
The Kenyan government at independence from colonial rule (late 1963) indicated its commitment to 
provide health services free of charge to citizens. This changed, with disastrous consequences, with 
the introduction of fees in December 1989. This policy was abandoned and then re-implemented 
within the space of two years. Policy has now come full circle with the reintroduction of free health 
care. 
 
Prior to the implementation of user fees, a review of fee options and an estimation of the total 
revenue that could be generated were undertaken (Ellis 1987). Ellis, an international advisor on fees, 
predicted that revenue would be between 10% and 22% of the government’s total recurrent health 
care costs, even when charging relatively ‘modest’ fees. Although the fees introduced were similar to 
the highest fee structure recommended by Ellis (1987), the revenue raised was however 
approximately 2% to 3% of the recurrent budget (Mwanzia & Mwabu 1993; Mwabu, Mwanzia & 
Liambila 1995). The major reason for the discrepancy between predicted and actual revenue is that 
Ellis assumed that there would be a maximum 20% decrease in utilisation at government facilities, 
whereas utilisation of services at facilities that charged fees actually fell by approximately 52%. The 
Kenyan government decided to abolish the outpatient registration fee* in September 1990. Utilisation 
increased by about 41% thereafter (Mwabu et al 1995). 
 
Although children under five years of age and the indigent were officially exempted from the fees, 
these groups were not entirely protected. During the period when the fees were in force, the use of 
government health facilities in one district by those living below the absolute poverty line was more 
than 30% lower than the use by those with incomes of at least twice the poverty line (Mbugua, Bloom 
& Segall 1995). Outpatient visits of young children to government facilities increased by 26% after 
the registration fee was abolished, while the utilisation of government facilities for severe illness 
episodes in children more than doubled. 
 
During the latter part of 1991 and early 1992, a process of gradually reintroducing outpatient fees 
was initiated. These fees were treatment fees, as opposed to the previous registration fees. They 
were first instituted at major hospitals, then at provincial level hospitals and finally at local facility level 
(Collins, Quick, Musau, Kraushaar & Hussein 1996). The phased-in introduction of fees, combined 
with broader fee exemptions than in the 1989/90 experiment (still including children under five years), 
resulted in much smaller decreases in outpatient utilisation (6%) and a steady increase in revenue. 
There are unfortunately no published studies that evaluated the impact of fees in Kenya in recent 
years.  
 
*This was a fee paid on arrival at the facility, which only covered the consultation. There were separate 
charges for other services, such as diagnostic tests and prescribed medicines. The registration fee 
generated the major portion of user-fee revenue in the late 1980s. 
 
The evidence on the consequences of user fees highlights the fact that the introduction or 
increase in fees can lead to dramatic declines in health service utilisation, particularly for 
the most vulnerable groups (e.g. the poor and household members who have difficulty in 
accessing household resources, such as women and children). As indicated previously, this 
decline is not necessarily related to reduced ‘frivolous’ use. Indeed, a number of studies 
show that fees at primary care facilities in particular can deter low income households from 
seeking care until an illness is severe (Heller 1982; Berman, Ormond & Gani 1987; Gilson 
1988; Weaver 1995). This is likely to aggravate poverty as more advanced illnesses tend to 
require more expensive treatment and will have a more significant adverse effect on ill 
people’s ability to work and generate income (these household level impacts are covered in 
more detail later in this section). Recent research in Ethiopia highlighted that fees 




particularly affect the use of government facilities by the poorest, who increasingly turn to 
self-treatment and/or the use of informal providers such as untrained drug sellers (Asfaw, 
von Braun & Klasen 2004). There were similar findings in Ghana where the poor were 
reported to resort to self-medication as a cost-saving strategy (Asenso-Okyere, Anum, Osei-
Akoto & Adukonu 1998). 
 
d. User fees and quality of care 
Although the majority of the evidence suggests substantial adverse consequences of user 
fees for the utilisation of health services, some studies suggest that, if some of the revenue 
was used to improve quality of care (particularly improved availability of medicines at 
government facilities), the positive effect of quality care may offset the negative effect of 
price increases. The reason for this is that patients previously chose not to use government 
facilities because they knew that they anyway would have to purchase the medicines that 
they needed from a private pharmacy or an informal drug seller. For example, in an 
experiment in Cameroon, overall utilisation increased in the long term after fee revenue was 
used to improve quality of care, especially for the poorest (Litvack & Bodart 1993). 
Another study in Niger found that the introduction of pilot cost-recovery schemes resulted 
in increased utilisation levels, again particularly among the poor. A specific component of 
the pilot schemes was the improvement of quality of care through improved availability of 
pharmaceutical supplies and training of staff in the use of standardised diagnosis and 
treatment protocols (Diop, Yazbeck & Bitrán 1995). 
 
However, it has been noted that quality of care must improve rapidly after the introduction 
of fees (Vogel 1988), or possibly even before the introduction of fees (Gilson 1998), and 
that such quality improvements require a substantial investment in both fixed and variable 
costs (Wouters 1995). It is also necessary to sustain quality improvements, which require 
adequate revenue generation and facility level incentives to strive continually to improve 
and maintain the quality of care (Gilson, Russell & Buse 1995). It should also be noted that 
all the studies that included a quality of care component were evaluating localised pilot 
projects. It is thus debatable whether fee revenue generation will be adequate to improve 
quality of care (and sustain quality improvements) when introduced on a more wide-scale 
basis (Gilson et al 1995). 
 
In addition, there appears to be little or no explicit targeting of received revenue to extend 
and improve services for the poor. As noted by Gilson et al (1995: 380) who conducted an 
extensive literature review, “no study was found which directly assessed whether fee 
revenue use has disproportionately benefited the poor or the nature and extent of cross-
subsidies within user fee systems”. 
 
e. Experience of protecting the poor via exemptions from adverse consequences  
    of fees 
These African experiences also clearly demonstrate the ineffectiveness of exemption 
mechanisms, particularly those aimed at protecting the poor (McPake, Hanson & Mills 
1992; Gilson et al 1995; Willis & Leighton 1995). To cite but one example from the myriad 
of studies on exemptions conducted in different African countries –  which all reached 
similar conclusions – a survey of 17 government facilities in Kenya found that on average 
only two patients per month received fee waivers, despite 42% of the Kenyan population 
living below the poverty line (Owino & Were 1999). Over 80% of patients were unaware of 
the exemptions policy.  




The example of Ghana’s experiences of fee exemptions is particularly informative and is 
summarised below. 
 
Box 3: Fee exemptions in Ghana 
There are a range of official health fee exemptions in Ghana, including for specific services 
(those for major communicable diseases, immunisations, antenatal and post-natal care) and for 
certain services aimed at specified demographic and socio-economic groups (children under 
five years, pregnant women, the elderly/people above 70 years, and paupers). Most importantly, 
the Ghanaian government has an explicit mechanism for funding exemptions, which stipulates 
that health care facilities can submit a statement of fee revenue ‘lost’ through exemptions to 
request reimbursement. This is a major innovation as exemptions are ‘unfunded’ in most 
countries, leaving health care providers with weak incentives to exempt patients from fees. 
 
Despite Ghana having a relatively comprehensive health care policy, there is considerable 
evidence that the fee exemption policy is poorly implemented. For example, one study in the 
Volta region of Ghana found that 84% of patients who were eligible for exemptions did not 
receive them (Nyonator & Kutzin 1999).  A more recent national study found that almost half of 
the clients interviewed and who were eligible for exemptions had in fact paid for services 
(Garshong, Ansah, Dakpallah, Huijts & Adjei 2002). Research has also highlighted that the poor 
very seldom receive exemptions, while the demographic categories (under-five-year old 
children, the elderly and pregnant women) are more frequently exempted (Adams, Darko, 
Accorsi, Tetteh, Anemana, Agongo & Banka 2002).  Although this is ‘good news’ from the 
perspective of improving access for young children and their mothers during pregnancy, it 
highlights the plight of those who do not fall into these demographic categories and yet are 
extremely vulnerable as they have very limited financial resources. 
 
Several factors contribute to the ‘lower than desirable’ effectiveness of exemption 
implementation practice (Garshong et al 2002). One factor is the lack of clarity among health 
service providers about the exemption policy (who is exempted and for which specific services). 
Another factor is that certain patient categories, such as pregnant women, are easier to identify 
than others. While it is sometimes difficult to establish the exemption eligibility of patients on the 
basis of age, the most serious problem relates to identifying ‘paupers’. There are also obstacles 
on the health service user side. A national survey of patients found that, while most patients 
know of the policy, the level of awareness of specific exemption categories is poor. Of even 
greater concern is that many patients who are aware of their eligibility for exemption sometimes 
do not exercise their rights due to fear of confrontations with providers. Barriers to seeking and 
obtaining exemptions are likely to be particularly severe for the poor given the stigma attached 
to applying for pauper status in a crowded health facility. Finally, funds set aside for exemption 
reimbursements are insufficient, and there are often lengthy delays in disbursing these funds to 
care facilities. 
 
Exemption mechanisms for the poor tend to be the least effective. But looking at it from a 
children’s perspective as the primary focus of this paper, it is encouraging that exemption 
systems targeting specific demographic groups such as young children are generally 
reported to be considerably more effective, largely because such groups are easier to 
identify. Nevertheless, if health care facilities are not committed to implementing 
exemptions, even easily-identifiable groups such as young children will not receive the 
exemptions to which they are entitled. A very recent study in the Lindi district of Tanzania 
reports that, although children under five years are eligible for a fee exemption from all 
health services, only 20% of such children were exempted from fees when admitted to 









f. Household level consequences of user fees 
The mounting evidence on the adverse service utilisation consequences and the inability of 
exemption mechanisms to protect some of the most vulnerable groups has resulted in 
questions being raised about the wisdom of imposing fees on users of public sector health 
services. There are particular concerns about the household level consequences of fees, both 
in terms of treatment-seeking decision-making (whether or not one seeks care when ill and 
which providers are used) and their effect on household livelihoods. Unfortunately, the 
household level studies that have been undertaken do not specifically focus on the impact 
on children. Nevertheless, deteriorating livelihoods due to the burden of paying for health 
care have an impact on all members of the household, including children (e.g. reduced food 
consumption in a household will have adverse consequences for children). 
 
In South Africa, a national household survey of health needs and health care affordability 
was conducted just after the introduction of free care services for young children and 
pregnant women. The study showed that 22% of African interviewees reported being 
refused treatment on the grounds of being unable to pay. Approximately 54% of 
unemployed Africans and 18% of white-collar workers reported not seeking treatment as 
they felt unable to pay for it (Hirschowitz & Orkin 1995).  
 
A Tanzanian survey among individuals who had used health services in the preceding four 
weeks indicated that 84% of rural dwellers found it either difficult or very difficult to find 
money for health service utilisation, while 81% of urban dwellers experienced similar 
problems (Abel-Smith & Rawal 1992). The 1994 Demographic and Health Survey in 
Zimbabwe indicated that 42% of the urban poor and 14% of the rural poor cited inability to 
afford health care fees when indicating why they had not sought care for an illness that they 
experienced in the previous month (Bitrán & Giedion 2002). Similar results were found in 
many other African country studies. 
 
The direct costs of obtaining health care can account for a substantial proportion of 
households’ income. Payments for health services and medicines accounted for an average 
of 4% – 5% of household incomes in the African countries surveyed by Makinen, Waters, 
Rauch, Almagambetova, Bitran, Gilson, McIntyre, Pannarunothai, Prieto, Ubilla & Ram 
(2000). When other direct costs associated with obtaining care (such as transport costs) are 
included, some studies have found that total direct costs can be as high as 10% of household 
income (Lucas & Nuwagaba 1999). The direct costs of long-term potentially fatal illness, 
particularly AIDS, have the most devastating effects on households. A study in Tanzania 
has estimated that the direct costs of treatment for a person living with AIDS during a six-
month period is about 64% of per capita household income for the same period (Tibaijuka 
1997). There is consistent evidence that the heaviest burden of health care costs, particularly 
those that are considered catastrophic, falls on the poorest households (Xu, Evans, 
Kawabata, Zeramdini, Klavus & Murray 2003). For example, a study in Malawi found that 
the cost of malaria to households was over 7% of their income on average; but for the 
poorest households, these costs were as much as a third of their income (Ettling, McFarland, 
Schultz & Chitsulo 1994). 
 
There is growing international evidence that health care costs can plunge households into 
poverty and that the likelihood of a poor household ever being able to move out of poverty 
diminishes when confronted with illness-related costs (Whitehead, Dahlgren & Evans 
2001).  While this particularly relates to catastrophic illness, even routine ambulatory care 
with so-called nominal fees can worsen the situation of extremely poor households.  In 




order to cope with the costs of ill-health, households use strategies such as reducing 
consumption (including of basic necessities), selling assets and borrowing (McIntyre, 
Thiede, Dahlgren & Whitehead 2005). A recent study in Ethiopia found that households 
which had used available cash to pay for health care had intended to use the money for 
basic consumption needs including food, fuel, clothes and education (Russell & Abdella 
2002). Assets sold may include those that are essential to the household’s future livelihood, 
such as livestock and land. A study in Asia indicated that 60% of forced land sales were due 
to illness (Corbett 1989).   
 
Borrowing to cover health care expenses is extremely widespread in Africa. A survey in 
Tanzania found that 40% of respondents had borrowed money to pay for health services 
used in the preceding four weeks (Abel-Smith & Rawal 1992). Another study found that 
between 25% and 49% of respondents in surveys in Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Guinea and 
Burundi borrowed money from family and friends to pay for health services (McPake, 
Hanson & Mills 1993). They have noted (1993:1391-1392) that, “the evidence suggests that 
when ill, most people seem to find amounts of money which appear large in relation to their 
regular incomes. This is probably a tribute to the informal risk sharing mechanism of the 
extended family and other community support mechanisms. Nevertheless, it highlights the 
plight of those who fall through this safety net for whom even charges for very basic care 
may be prohibitive”. 
 
Although the above experiences refer to households in general, they have direct relevance 
for children. Given that young children more frequently need health services than adults, the 
coping strategies adopted (e.g. selling assets and borrowing) often relate to obtaining cash 
to access health services for children. The impact on livelihood also affects children, for 
example when funds are no longer available to cover school fees. 
 
The evidence about the adverse consequences of user fees for household livelihoods is so 
overwhelming that even the arch-protagonist of user fees in the 1980s and 1990s, the World 
Bank, has acknowledged that, “Out-of-pocket payments for health services – especially 
hospital care – can make the difference between a household being poor or not” (Claeson, 
Griffin, Johnston, McLachlan, Soucat, Wagstaff & Yazbeck 2001:1). This indicates that 
alternative financing mechanisms such as insurance may be preferable. Another institution 
that has historically supported user fees, the US government, took a bold step when in its 
2001 foreign appropriations bill reports that it required the US Congress to oppose any 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund or other multilateral development bank loan 
which includes user fees for basic health or education services, and to report to Congress 
within 10 days if any loan or other agreement is approved which includes such fees (US 
Network for Global Economic Justice 2003). 
 
There is increasing international advocacy for the removal of fees, particularly at the 
primary health care level, which would benefit all people (including children) who are 
dependent on publicly-funded health services. For example, the British government’s 
foreign aid organisation, the Department for International Development (DfID) 
commissioned research to explore the feasibility of abolishing fees for primary health care. 
It is of particular importance from the perspective of this study that Save the Children are 
embarking on an advocacy initiative calling for free access to quality basic health services 
for all, as they believe that this is the most effective strategy for ensuring that children 
access services when needed. Some African countries, most notably South Africa, Uganda 
and Kenya, have already abolished all or some user fees, while others such as Tanzania are 
currently considering such a policy decision (Laterveer, Munga & Schwerzel 2004). 




4.2 Recent initiatives to introduce free health care provision 
Earlier sections clearly indicated that there were substantial adverse consequences from the 
introduction of user fees, particularly in relation to reduced utilisation of health services, 
and the greatest impact on household livelihoods for low income and poor households. It 
was also shown that exemption mechanisms are ineffective at protecting the poor due to 
difficulties in identifying the poor. It could be argued that the most effective way of 
protecting poor households from the potentially catastrophic costs of health care is to 
provide free care at public sector facilities (and if government subsidies are available, 
potentially also at mission facilities)4 for all users, although this will result in ‘leakage’ of 
benefits of free care to the non-poor. It is beneficial to review the experience of those 
countries that have introduced free health care to assess whether the adverse consequences 
of user fees are reversed (e.g. by evidence of increased utilisation and particular benefits for 
the poor) as a result of a free care policy. 
 
Uganda introduced user fees on a universal basis in 1993 in order to meet a World Bank 
loan conditionality (Okuonzi 2004). Although revenue generation was relatively low 
(generally less than 5% of expenditure) it was an important source of funds for 
supplementing health worker salaries, maintaining facilities and purchasing additional drugs 
(Burnham, Pariyo, Galiwango & Wabwire-Mangen 2004). However, there were growing 
concerns about the consequences of user fees, particularly for the poor (Burnham et al 
2004). In 1999, a participatory poverty assessment highlighted the extent of the impact on 
the poor and the level of grassroots dissatisfaction with the policy (Okuonzi 2004; Yates 
2004). 
 
User fees at public sector facilities were abolished in March 2001, with the exception of 
private wards (Yates 2004). Various studies have shown that utilisation of health services 
increased immediately and dramatically. One study of 78 health facilities in 10 districts, 
using data for eight months before and 12 months after the removal of fees, found that the 
mean monthly number of new visits increased by 53%, although in the case of children <5 
years of age the increase was only 27%, while repeat visits increased by 24% overall but by 
81% for children <5. The researchers were not able to postulate as to the reason for this 
pattern of utilisation increases in young children. Although immunisations, antenatal 
services and family planning had always been free, utilisation of these services also 
increased (by 17%, 25% and 32% respectively) after the removal of fees (Burnham et al 
2004). Two years after the abolition of fees, sustained utilisation increases of 77% were 
recorded (Yates 2004). 
 
An extensive study using the first and second Ugandan National Household Surveys 
(conducted in 1999/2000 and 2002/03 respectively) and data from the Health Management 
Information System highlighted that the poor had particularly benefited from the removal of 
fees (Deininger & Mpuga 2004). Although the incidence of reported illness in the previous 
30 days was similar in the two surveys (of slightly less than 30%), the percentage of those 
who were sick and who sought professional care increased from 69% to 79%, while the 
number of days when the sick person was unable to work declined from 8.3 to 7 days on 
average. In addition, 30% of those who did not seek care cited inability to afford health care 
as the reason in 2002/03, compared to 50% in 1999/2000. The poor benefited most from the 
                                                 
4 This will clearly not solve access problems fully as the distribution of public health care facilities is poor and many rural 
communities have no option but to use private providers. Mission and other NGO facilities are an important source of 
care in rural areas in many African countries, but often the primary source of care for poor rural communities is that of 
informal drug sellers. 




abolition of fees, utilisation of health services when the ill increased from 58% to 70% in 
the case of the poorest quintile, and from 80% to 85% for those in the richest quintile.  
 
A key finding of this study was that, although there were substantial differences between 
the rich and the poor in their use of health services when ill and while fees were in place, 
these differences were completely eliminated in the case of children (but not in the case of 
adults) after the removal of fees. Once again, the researchers did not explore the underlying 
reasons for this difference, but it could feasibly be related to children receiving priority 
within households in relation to health care use. Given that the removal of fees does not 
eliminate all costs of illness and treatment seeking, such as transport to a facility and time 
lost to productive activities, the above finding suggests that, in the poorest households, 
children will be taken to a health care facility when ill, whereas adults will avoid seeking 
treatment if possible to avoid non-user-fee direct costs and losing productive work time to 
seek care. 
 
A number of the studies have highlighted that the sustained utilisation increases and related 
positive outcomes, such as national immunisation coverage increases from 41% in 
1999/2000 to 84% in 2002/03 (Yates 2004), could not have been achieved without an 
increase in the resources available for public sector health services. Of particular 
importance was the pro-active provision of a $5.5 million buffer fund by the Ministry of 
Health to offset the potential impact on availability of drugs arising from the loss of fee 
revenue and utilisation increases (Burnham et al. 2004). In addition, the move away from 
project donor funds to the provision of general budget support to the Ministry of Health by 
donors under a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) initiative resulted in the Ministry budget 
doubling in real terms between 1999/2000 and 2002/03. The Ministry has control over the 
allocation of these SWAp resources and has directed the additional resources preferentially 
to primary health care services. District budgets have increased seven-fold since 1999/2000 
(Yates 2004). This implies that previously, donor funds allocated via specific projects (often 
vertical programs) were not consistently supporting primary level services. 
 
While there is overwhelming evidence of the substantial positive consequences of fee 
removal in Uganda, particularly for the poorest, there have been some negative 
consequences. Of particular concern is the decline in staff morale (Burnham et al 2004).  
This is related to the loss of fee revenue which had previously been used to supplement staff 
salaries, as well as the fact that workload had increased by about 47%. Health workers and 
members of the health facility management committees also indicated that maintenance of 
health facilities and cleanliness had declined. It should be noted, however, that these 
findings were obtained in the 12 months after the fee removal. The more recent substantial 
increases in primary care facility budgets may have improved staff workload ratios. 
 
It is too early to evaluate the consequences of fee removal in Kenya, given that it was only 
announced on 20 June 20045. This policy arose from an election promise to provide free 
health care and free primary education in the 2002 general elections.  Free primary 
education was introduced in January 2003, but limited funds and overcrowded schools 
resulted in the government deciding to address these problems before introducing free 
health care. As from 1 July 2004, most fees were removed at primary care facilities. 
Children under five years of age were exempted from all fees for primary care services, but 
all other patients were expected to pay a nominal registration fee. Although the stated 
                                                 
5 All information on the Kenyan experience provided by Jane Chuma, Kilifi, KEMRI (Kenya Medical Research Institute). 




intention is to remove fees from public hospital services as well, it is envisaged that this will 
only be feasible once social health insurance has been introduced. 
 
As with Uganda, the Kenyan government did make additional resources available to 
support the implementation of the free care policy. However, the additional $51.5 
million appears to have been inadequate; it simply returned Kenyan government health 
spending levels to the pre-fee levels in the late 1980s. Unpublished results of an early 
evaluation of the Kenyan policy indicate that major difficulties have been encountered, 
particularly in terms of declining availability of drugs at primary care facilities, but also 
overcrowding problems, although the latter finding suggests substantial increases in 
utilisation. 
 
5. Conclusions to the analysis of the free health care for 
children programme  
The overall objective of the Means to Live Project is to assess whether government policies 
or programmes that target individuals or groups of beneficiaries at whom the intended 
intervention is aimed, do indeed reach the intended beneficiaries – in this instance children 
living in poverty.  
 
The provision of free health care is indeed an internationally accepted and appropriate 
mechanism to alleviate the burden of health care costs for the poor. As reflected in the 
experiences from a number of African countries, the removal of user fees does increase 
utilisation and frees up scarce household income for other uses. It also shows that the poor 
do enjoy proportionally greater benefit from the removal of user fees. Unfortunately most of 
the evaluations from the African countries did not indicate the specific effect of user fees, or 
the removal thereof, on children. It thus has to be assumed that the demonstrated overall 
benefit to poorer households of health service fee removal also benefits the children living 
in those households.  
 
Although the exact beneficiaries of fee removal policies have not been established in the 
South African context, it is most likely that it has benefited the lowest income groups, given 
that they are the primary users of public sector health services – particularly at the primary 
care level – and that medical scheme members (mainly from the highest income groups) are 
explicitly excluded from the benefits of the free care policies.  
 
The South African policy of free health care is indeed a politically desirable and 
economically appropriate one, where the initial emphasis on young children and pregnant 
women was an appropriate start for the more universal policy that followed. The current 
application of free health care in South Africa is a mixture of a targeted and a universal 
intervention, where it progressed from a narrower policy targeted initially at children under 
six years and pregnant women, and then expanded to universal free health care at a primary 
level for all non-medical scheme members using public sector facilities. The current policy 
for children is still targeted, where younger children and children with moderate to severe 
disabilities benefit from free health care at all levels of care, whilst children older than six 
and with no or mild disabilities have to pay for hospital access according to a sliding scale 
based on a means test. 
 




It is fair to conclude in principle that free primary health care does cater for all children in 
need. In the analysis of programme implementation it seems as if practices regarding user 
fees are being appropriately applied at the primary level at least. However, of concern is the 
anecdotal evidence that children older than six that are unable to pay are still being turned 
away at hospitals. This is clearly contradictory to the spirit of the policy and indeed to the 
commitment of ensuring children’s right to health and health care. Based on recent Burden 
of Disease estimates (Bradshaw et al 2003), children older than five years primarily suffer 
from health conditions relating to trauma, HIV and chronic health conditions, amongst 
others. These are all conditions that are likely to require some degree of hospital treatment 
on a once-off or ongoing basis. Children in this age group also have to expend scarce 
household resources on school fees and other educational requirements; yet if 14 years or 
older they are not able to access the Child Support Grant. Such children would therefore 
not, for example, benefit from hospital fee exemptions as per the H0 exemption criteria in 
the example provided in Box 1 on page 10. The exact nature of hospital practices for older 
children requires more in-depth investigation. 
 
Aside from the potential increased access by removing user fees for children, many barriers 
to health care other than user fees still exist. Addressing these barriers is particularly 
important in ensuring that the poorest and most vulnerable children benefit from free care. 
These need to be addressed concomitantly as part of ensuring children’s right to basic 
health care services – transport to and from health services being one of the key 
considerations. It is clear that the removal of user fees as a means to improve access for 
children living in poverty is not enough. Unless there is sustained budgetary commitment to 
ensure the continued availability of good quality health services, children will not 
necessarily have access to the required health interventions. The South African health 
budgetary analysis reflects a worrying trend in this regard given that the health budget, 
including that for primary health care, has stagnated since the late 1990s in real terms. This 
is especially of concern in the face of the growing HIV pandemic that brings with it an 
increase need for more complex health interventions at all levels of care, as well as 
significantly increasing numbers of patients that present with HIV- and AIDS-related 
illnesses.  
 
The provision of free health care practically coincided with the rise of the HIV pandemic in 
the country. The need to introduce new health service interventions thus became necessary. 
Interventions that specifically relate to children include the provision of counselling and 
voluntary testing for HIV to their parents/caregivers and to older children (although these 
do not exist in real terms as most health workers are not trained to council children); the 
prevention of mother-to-child transmission programme; specific prophylactic interventions 
for children with HIV such as Cotrimoxazole prophylaxis; and nutritional support (in some 
areas this includes the provision of free milk formula). Antiretroviral therapy for children 
has recently commenced and requires input from health facilities at all levels of care. 
Currently almost 40% of child deaths are due to HIV (Bradshaw et al 2004) and many 
hospitals report that at least 40% of their in-patient admissions are for HIV-related 
conditions (Shung-King 1998). One might thus extrapolate that at least 40% of children at 
all levels of care will require support for HIV.  
 
Whilst there has not yet been a formal evaluation to assess the impact of HIV in children on 
health service utilisation at all levels of care, many reports (including anecdotal ones) point 
to a health service that is ill-prepared to cater adequately for children in this regard. Given 
that children with HIV require health services on a long-term basis, require more complex 
care and treatment and require health workers to have additional skills and expertise to 




address the needs of children with HIV adequately, the potential impact on health service 
provision at all levels is significant. The impact of the HIV pandemic, in relation to the 
impact of free health care provision, requires further analysis. 
 
Whilst the evaluations on the potentially differential impact of free health care provision 
focus on urban versus rural and facilities in rich versus poor areas, one might deduce that 
the reported unmanageable increases in workload and resultant decrease in quality of care 
would impact much more on health facilities in rural and poorer areas. These most likely 
started out with a below-baseline level of staffing and quality of care, and are likely to have 
felt the impact of the increased workload and the subsequent demands of the HIV pandemic 
much more – possibly widening the inequity in relation to their urban and richer 
counterparts. This again poses a further challenge for health systems research. 
 
Given the current non-coverage of children older than six with no or mild disabilities by the 
free health care policy, the application of user fees at hospitals for older children where 
such user fees might prevent children from accessing these levels of care must be re-
examined in the context of potential negative impact on access. Previous research in South 
Africa has shown that user fees for patients in the H0 – H2 categories generate extremely 
little revenue and the costs of administering the means test and collecting fees from low-
income patients (who frequently need to be sent repeated accounts before payment) 
translate into very low net revenue levels (Dangschat & McIntyre 1996). It would be 
valuable to evaluate whether this is still the case, given that the introduction of the new 
UPFS may have increased revenue levels.   
 
As medical schemes are actively negotiating with public facilities to become preferred 
providers for hospital care for their members – and that these scheme members would be 
treated in ‘differentiated amenities’ – there would be a great incentive for medical scheme 
members to declare their membership status, thereby obviating the need for costly means 
testing procedures. Submission of accounts to medical schemes would be streamlined and 
less costly than the current billing administration. While there may be concerns about 
utilisation increases, this will be minimised by only providing free care to those who have 
followed the appropriate referral channels. In this context, any increase in utilisation will be 
addressing currently unmet need rather than related to ‘frivolous’ use. 
 
A further concern is the point highlighted by Schneider & Gilson (1997), that “free health 
care for curative conditions is compromising the delivery of preventive care”. This is of 
particular concern for children as many childhood conditions rely on the execution of good 
preventative services such as immunisation, growth monitoring, nutrition programmes and 
health promotion outside of health facilities such as school health promotion activities. This 
is yet another issue requiring further exploration.  
 
Finally, the application of free health care to improve access of poor children to health 
services, although desirable and appropriate, is insufficient as an isolated policy 
commitment. It needs to be backed up with sustainable commitment to ensure that health 
services remain accessible in all respects. Further consideration must be given to some of 
the unintended consequences of such a policy decision and strong commitment to 















The following recommendations emerge from this analysis of free health care for children. 
 
1. A national evaluation to re-examine the impact of free health care is required in South 
Africa, given the expansion of this policy to a much wider group than children under six 
years and pregnant women. This is especially necessary in light of the HIV pandemic 
and its impact on all levels of health service provision. Specific issues that must be 
looked at include:  
Hospital practices regarding user fees for older children. 
The impact of free health care on the ability of primary level services to 
deliver quality preventative services. 
The benefit incidence of the free care policies (i.e. who is benefiting 
most from these policies and why). This would include the impact of 
free health care on the most marginalised groups in poor rural and peri-
urban settlements, as the impact of increased workloads and lack of 
resources might be affecting facilities primarily accessed by the poor 
more adversely.   
How user fees at hospitals are applied in the case of children older than 
six years, what the potential impact on older children’s access to 
hospital care is and what the best mechanisms are to minimise/abolish 
the need for mean-tested access to older children. 
 
2. Sustained budgetary commitment is required to strengthen the primary level of care, 
including the provision of adequate staff, drugs and related resources. 
 
3. Specific attention must be given to sustaining quality preventative services. 
 
4. Attention should to be given to other barriers to access, so as to maximise the potential 
of free health care. This requires fully exploring what factors are adversely affecting 
access to health care for the most vulnerable children and what policy options are most 
appropriate to address these obstacles. 
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